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Abstract
In the context of platform competition in a two-sided market, we study how ex-
ante uncertainty and ex-post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new
technology affects the strategies of the platforms and the market outcome. We find
that the incumbent dominates the market by setting the welfare-maximizing quantity
when the difference in the degree of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers
is significant. However, if this difference is below a certain threshold, then even the
incumbent platform will distort its quantity downward. Since a monopoly incumbent
would set the welfare-maximizing quantity, this result indicates that platform com-
petition may lead to a market failure: Competition results in a lower quantity and
lower welfare than a monopoly. We consider two applications of the model. First, we
consider multi-homing. We find that multi-homing solves the market failure resulting
from asymmetric information. However, if platforms can impose exclusive dealing, then
they will do so, which result in market inefficiency. Second, the model provides a new
argument for why it is usually entrants, not incumbents, that bring major technological
innovations to the market.
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1 Introduction
When platforms adopt new technologies, the users often do not know how much utility they
will obtain from a new technology until they join the platform. However, they can privately
learn this utility afterward. A new generation of operating systems for smartphones, such
as Apple’s iOS or Google’s Android, creates uncertainty among agents on both sides of the
market. Application developers may not know the costs of developing an application for this
new generation. Likewise, users may not know their utility from using the new software.
After developers and users join the platform, they privately learn their respective costs
and using habits, and thus, uncertainty is replaced with asymmetric information. Similar
examples abound. Gamers and third-part videogame developers may privately lean their
utility and cost from using a new technology for a videogame console — such as Microsoft’s
Xbox, Sony’s PlayStation or Nintendo’s Wii — but only after they adopt it.
This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market when agents on both
sides of the market face the informational problem. In this context we ask several questions.
First, we ask how the informational problem affects profits, prices, and market efficiency.
We find that asymmetric information may lead to a downward distortion of trade under
competition, while under monopoly full efficiency is achieved. Second, previous literature
has shown that platforms use a divide-and-conquer strategy by subsidizing one side of the
market in order to attract it. This raises the question of how the informational problem
affects the decision which side to subsidize. We show that it is optimal for a monopoly
platform to subsidize the side with the smaller information problem. Under competition,
the decision which side to subsidize is also affected by asymmetric information, though the
relation is not as straightforward. Given the results for the competition between platforms,
we study two applications: multi-homing and technology change. In the first application,
we allow agents to multi-home (i.e., register to both competing platforms simultaneously).
We ask whether platforms benefit from multi-homing or have an incentive to restrict the
agents’ ability to multi-home by imposing exclusive dealing. We find that the incumbent
dominates the market and earns higher profit under multi-homing than under single-homing.
Moreover, multi-homing solves the market failure resulting from asymmetric information in
that the incumbent can always induce the efficient level of trade. However, if platforms can
impose exclusive dealing, they will do so, resulting in an inefficiently low level of trade. In
the second application, we ask how the informational problem affects the decision to adopt
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a new technology. We show that a new technology and the resulting informational problem
benefits the incumbent more than the entrant; but despite that, the entrant has a higher
incentive than the incumbent to adopt a new technology.
We study competition between two platforms in a two-sided market that is composed of
buyers and sellers. The platforms are undifferentiated except for the beliefs they are facing.
One of the platforms is an incumbent that benefits from agents’ favorable beliefs. Under
favorable beliefs, agents expect all other agents to join the incumbent unless it is a dominant
strategy for them not to join the platform. The favorable beliefs that the incumbent enjoys
make it difficult for the second platform, the entrant, to gain market share. The two platforms
implement a new technology, such as a new generation of video game consoles or operating
systems. All players are uninformed about the buyers’ valuation and sellers’ costs from
using the new technology. Buyers and sellers privately learn this information after joining a
platform but before they trade. They can only trade through a platform.
We assume that the two platforms compete by offering fixed access fees as well as menus
of quantities and transaction fees as a function of buyers’ valuation parameter and sellers’
costs. Buyers and sellers then choose which platform to join and pay the relevant access fees.
Once they join the platform, they privately observe their valuation and cost, and choose a
line from the menu. Given their choices, they trade for the specified quantity.
Before studying competition, we first consider a monopoly benchmark. We find that a
monopolist who benefits from favorable beliefs sets a contract which motivates the sellers and
buyers to trade the quantity that maximizes total social welfare (i.e., maximizes the gains
from trade). A monopolist that suffers from unfavorable beliefs, however, sets a contract
that distorts the quantity below the welfare-maximizing level. Moreover, the monopolist fac-
ing unfavorable beliefs charges zero access fees from the side with the lowest informational
problem. Intuitively, both monopoly platforms need to pay ex-post information rents to the
buyers and sellers for motivating them to reveal their private information after they joined
the platform. A monopolist that benefits from favorable beliefs can ex-ante capture these
expected information rents through access fees. In contrast, a monopolist that faces unfa-
vorable beliefs needs to subsidize one side of the market in order to attract it and therefore
cannot extract the expected information rents from both sides. Thus, such a monopolist has
an incentive to distort the quantity downward in order to reduce the information rents.
We then consider competition between the incumbent and the entrant, facing favorable
and unfavorable beliefs respectively. Under competition, we find that the incumbent dom-
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inates the market by setting the welfare-maximizing quantity — i.e., the same as under
monopoly — only if the difference in the degree of asymmetric information between buyers
and sellers is significant. However, if this difference is below a certain threshold, then even
the incumbent platform will distort its quantity downward. Since a monopolist benefiting
from favorable beliefs always sets the welfare-maximizing quantity, this result indicates that
platform competition might result in a market failure: Competition results in a lower quan-
tity and lower welfare than monopoly. In this case, competition also leads the two platforms
to subsidize opposite sides in their divide-and-conquer strategies.
We present two applications of the model. First, we examine how market outcome is
affected by the sellers’ ability to multi-home (i.e., join both platforms). A developer of a
smartphone’s application, for example, might choose to develop an application for more than
one operating system. Likewise, a videogame developer might choose to develop a videogame
for more than one videogame console. We find that the incumbent dominates the market and
earns a higher profit under multi-homing than under single-homing. Multi-homing solves the
market failure resulting from asymmetric information in that the incumbent can motivate
the two sides to trade for the welfare-maximizing quantity even if the difference in the degree
of asymmetric information between the two sides is small. However, if the incumbent offers
the optimal contract under multi-homing, the entrant can take the market over from the
incumbent by preventing the seller from multi-homing (e.g., imposing exclusive dealing or
making the technologies of the two platforms incompatible. This leads to the single-homing
equilibrium and the resulting market failure, where the trade level is below the welfare-
maximizing level.
As another application of our model, we investigate if the entrant or the incumbent have
incentive to bring major technological innovation to the market. Even though entrants often
leapfrog the incumbents (e.g. in video game console industry1), there is no consensus in the
existing literature on the topic. The incumbent, enjoying the installed base and favorable
beliefs, has higher returns from adopting a new technology than the entrant; therefore, the
incumbent has more incentives to innovate. This is the argument behind the seminal paper
of Gilbert and Newbery (1982). In practice, however, incumbents often lag behind, even if
they are aware of the entrant threat. Reinganum (1983) shows that it may be a result of
uncertainty about the success of the new technology. The incumbent has some profits from
the old technology, while the entrant has not. Therefore, the gain to the incumbent from
1E.g., see Hagiu and Halaburda (2009).
4
the success of the new technology is smaller than the gain to the entrant. This gives the
entrant higher incentive to adopt a new technology. We add to this discussion by exploring
the question of technology adoption in a two-sided market environment with an additional
level of uncertainty — the informational problem. We extend our basic model of platform
competition under asymmetric information to the case where the two platforms can choose
between two technologies: an incremental technology and a radically innovative technology
that can be highly successfully but only with some probability (otherwise the radical tech-
nology fails to provide any payoff to the two sides). Since the incumbent wins the market if
both platforms choose the same technology, in an equilibrium the incumbent and the entrant
always adopt different technologies. However, whether the incumbent or the entrant adopts
the radical technology depends on its probability of success and the level of asymmetric
information. If the success probability is low, the entrant has stronger incentive to adopt the
radical technology. That is, the more radical the innovation, the more likely it is that the
entrant — not the incumbent — adopts it. Moreover, we show that the above results relay
on the presence of asymmetric information: under full information, there are two equilibria
in which the two platforms choose different technologies, regardless of the probability of
success of the radical technology.
1.1 Related Literature
The economic literature on competing platforms extends the work of Katz and Shapiro (1985)
on competition with network effects, where the size of the network creates additional value
to the customers (e.g. telephone network). Spiegler (2000) considers a model with positive
externality among two agents and finds that a third party, such as a platform, can extract
these externalities by using exclusive interaction contracts, that includes reducing the pay-
ment to one of the agent if the other agent also signs with the third party. Caillaud and
Jullien (2001) analyze a market with price competition between two platforms. The plat-
forms are undifferentiated, except for the fact that one of the platforms (the incumbent)
benefits from favorable beliefs, while the other platform (the entrant) faces unfavorable be-
liefs. Under favorable beliefs, agents expect all other agents to join the incumbent, unless
it is a dominant strategy for them not to join the platform. Caillaud and Jullien show that
both platforms will use a divide-and-conquer strategy, where they charge a negative access
price from one of the sides of the market and positive from the other side. Moreover, their
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paper finds that if platforms cannot use transaction fees, then the incumbent makes posi-
tive profit even without product differentiation, while with transaction fees, both platforms
make zero profit. Caillaud and Jullien extend their results in their (2003) paper. In the
(2003) paper, platforms have an imperfect matching technology which identifies correctly
and matches agents successfully with probability λ ∈ [0, 1]. In this modified environment
and under single-homing, the only equilibria are dominant firm equilibria. However, because
of the imperfect matching technology, there are also efficient multi-homing equilibria. Jullien
(2008) considers platform competition in the context of multi-sided markets with vertically
differentiated platforms and sequential game, and analyzes the resulting pricing strategies.
Our model follows this line of literature by considering two competing platforms where
agents’ beliefs are favorable toward one of the platforms and unfavorable toward the other.
However, our model introduces asymmetric information which has not been considered in
this context. Introduction of asymmetric information allows us to study how informational
problem affects platform competition.
An optimal strategy of a platform often involves subsidizing one side of the market. The
question which side of the market should be subsidized — which we address in our paper —
has been also present in the literature. Armstrong (2006) considers differentiated competing
matchmakers with a positive network externality. He shows that matchmakers compete
more aggressively on the side that generates larger benefits to the other side (i.e. the one
that has lower value from matching). This competition results in lower prices for the agents
on the lower-valuation side. Hagiu (2006) considers a model of competing platforms when
agents are sellers and buyers. Moreover, the platforms first compete on one of the sides, and
only then move to compete on the other side. He finds that platforms’ ability to commit to
their second stage prices makes it less likely to have exclusive equilibria. However, the two
papers (Armstrong (2006) and Hagiu (2006)) do not consider the information problem that
we investigate.
Several papers consider platforms that face informational problems. Ellison, Mo¨bius
and Fudenberg (2004) analyze competing uniform-price auctions, where the two sides of the
market are buyers and sellers. The model in Ellison, Mo¨bius and Fudenberg (2004) shares
the same information structure as in our model in that buyers and sellers are uninformed
about their valuations before joining the platform, and privately learn their valuations after
joining. However, Ellison, Mobius and Fudenberg (2004) consider a very restrictive price
competition between platforms (see their Section 7), where a platform can only charge an
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access price that must be the same in both sides of the market. Therefore, their paper does
not allow for divide-and-conquer strategies. Peitz, Rady and Trepper (2010) consider an
infinite horizon model with a platform that performs experimentation along time to learn
the demand of the two sides of the market. However, they do not analyze competition
between platforms and a coordination problem between the two sides of the market, which
is the focus of our paper.
Our model is also related to antitrust issues in two-sided markets. Amelio and Jul-
lien (2007) consider the case where platforms are forbidden to charge negative access price.
In such a case, platforms will use tying in order to increase the demand on one side of the
market, which in turn increases the demand on the other side. Choi (forthcoming) shows
that tying induces consumers to multi-home (i.e., register with more than one matchmaker).
Casadesus-Masanell and Ruiz-Aliseda (2009) consider competing platforms that can choose
whether to offer compatible systems, and find that incompatibility results in an equilibrium
with a dominant platform that earns higher profits than under compatibility. Hagiu and
Lee (2011) consider platforms that connect between content providers and consumers. They
find that if content providers can directly charge consumers for their content, then a mul-
tihoming equilibrium is possible. If platforms are the ones charging consumers for content,
then content providers will tend to deal exclusively with one of the platforms. These papers,
however, do not allow for asymmetric information in the context of platform competition.
2 Model and a Monopoly Platform Benchmark
Consider two sides of a market: seller side (S) and buyer side (B).2 The seller wishes to
sell a good to the buyer. However, the seller and the buyer cannot trade unless they join
the platform. For example, the buyer can represent a user of a new operating system while
the seller can represent a developer of an application for this new system. They can connect
only if they use the same operating system. The two players may also represent a game
developer for a new videogame console and a gamer, and they need a game console in order
to benefit from trading.
The utilities of the seller and the buyer from trading are t − C(q, c) and V (q, θ) − t,
2Alternatively, we can assume that there is some other number of buyers and sellers, but there is no
negative externalities among agents at the same side and agents’ types are not correlated. We relate to this
simplifying assumption in more details in Section 6.
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respectively, where C(q, c) is the seller’s production cost, V (q, θ) is the value of the product to
the buyer, and t is the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller. The seller’s production
cost depends on parameters q and c, while the buyer’s value depends on the parameters q
and θ. The parameter q describes the good exchanged between the buyer and the seller, where
we assume that Vq > 0 and Cq > 0 (subscripts denote partial derivatives). Specifically, the
parameter q can measure the quantity that the seller produces and transfers to the buyer.
Alternatively, q may measure quality, in which case the seller sells one indivisible good to
the buyer. More generally, we view q as a measure of the level of trade in the market. For
q = 0, C(0, c) = V (0, θ) = 0, so that no trade occurs. The parameters θ and c affect the
buyer’s willingness to pay and the seller’s production cost respectively, where Vθ > 0, Cc > 0,
Vqθ > 0 and Cqc > 0. One should think of θ as the buyer’s taste parameter that positively
affects the buyer’s marginal valuation of the product, and c as a technology parameter that
affects the seller’s marginal cost: Higher c increases the marginal cost.
Let q∗(θ, c) denote the quantity that maximizes the gains from trade for given θ and c,
i.e.,
q∗(θ, c) = arg max
q
{
V (q, θ)− C(q, c)} .
Hence, q∗(θ, c) solves
Vq(q
∗(θ, c), θ) = Cq(q∗(θ, c), c) . (1)
Suppose that Vqq ≤ 0 and Cqq ≥ 0 where at least one of these inequalities is strong and
Vq(0, θ) > Cq(0, c), while Vq(q, θ) < Cq(q, c) for q → ∞. Therefore, q∗(θ, c) is uniquely
defined by (1), and q∗(θ, c) is increasing with θ and decreasing with c. Let W ∗(θ, c) denote
the maximal welfare achievable for given θ and c, i.e., W ∗(θ, c) = V (q∗(θ, c), θ)−C(q∗(θ, c), c).
Throughout the paper, we assume that q is observable by all players and is contractible.
Amazon, for example, can easily observe the quantity sold on its website, and can charge
transaction fees from buyers, sellers, or both according to this quantity. Likewise, a con-
sole manufacturer can make quality specifications for its video games and make a payment
contingent on this quality. However, we realize that this assumption does not hold in some
other two-sided markets.3
Before proceeding to our main analysis of platform competition, in this section we study
the benchmark case of a monopolist connecting the two sides of the market. In such a case,
the buyer and the seller can either join the monopoly platform or stay out of the market.
3The analysis for markets with unobservable q deserves a separate paper.
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Before the buyer and the seller join the platform, all players are uninformed about θ and
c, and share a commonly known prior that θ is distributed between [θ0, θ1] according to
a distribution function k(θ) and a cumulative distribution K(θ), and that c is distributed
between [c0, c1] according to a distribution function g(c) and a cumulative distribution G(c).
We make the standard assumptions that (1−K(θ))/k(θ) is decreasing in θ and G(c)/g(c) is
increasing in c. Then, after joining the platform but before trading, the buyer and the seller
each observes their private information and chooses whether to trade or not. Moreover, we
assume throughout that all players are risk neutral.
More precisely, the timing of the game is following: First, the platform offers a contract
to the buyer and the seller. We explain the features of this contract below. The buyer and
the seller observe the offer and simultaneously decide whether to buy access to the platform
or not. At this point, they need to pay the access fees if they decide to join. After joining,
each agent observes the realization of his own private information, and decides whether to
trade or not. If both sides joined and decided to trade, the trade and transfers occur.
Notice that this model corresponds to a principal-agent problem under asymmetric in-
formation, where the platform is the principal and the buyer and seller are the agents. The
main features of the specific problem described here are related to Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) and Spulber (1988), with two exceptions. First, here the principal is a platform
(or competing platforms) that aims to “connect” the agents. Second, here players are ini-
tially uninformed, and the two sides learn their types only after contracting with a platform.
Asymmetric information is a typical feature of principal-agent problems. However, because
the principal is a platform, it introduces a novel element: coordination problem between the
two sides that allows the platform to use a divide-and-conquer strategy, where it subsidizes
one side in order to attract it and charge positive access fees from the other side.
Following the literature on principal-agent problems, suppose that a platform offers a
contract
Cont = {FS, FB, tS(θ, c), tB(θ, c), q(θ, c)} ,
where FS and FB are access fees that the buyer and the seller pay the platform for joining
the platform before knowing their private information. These fees can be zero or even
negative (as is the case under platform competition). Moreover, tS(θ, c), tB(θ, c), and q(θ, c)
are all menus given (θ, c), such that after joining the platform and observing their private
information, the buyer and the seller simultaneously report θ and c to the platform, and then
given these reports, the seller produces q(θ, c) and delivers it to the buyer. For simplicity, we
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assume that the buyer and the seller pay tS(θ, c) and tB(θ, c) directly to the platform instead
of to each other. Naturally, we allow tS(θ, c) and tB(θ, c) to be negative, so it is possible to
write an equivalent mechanism where one agent pays the platform and the platform pays the
other agent, or where one agent pays directly to the other agent and the platform charges
some royalty out of this transaction. Also, suppose that the buyer and the seller can always
refuse to trade after observing their private information, in which case they do not need to
pay tS(θ, c) and tB(θ, c). However, FS and FB are not refunded.
Finally, we follow previous literature on two-sided markets (Caillaud and Jullien (2001),
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Jullien (2008), in particular) by distinguishing between a
platform about which the agents have “favorable” or “optimistic” beliefs, called Po, and a
platform about which they have “unfavorable” or “pessimistic” beliefs, Pp. Favorable beliefs
mean that side i = {B, S} expects the other side j = {B, S}, j 6= i, to join platform Po
if side j gains non-negative payoffs from joining given that side i joins. In other words,
given the contract, if there is an equilibrium in which both sides join Po, they will do so. In
contrast, under unfavorable beliefs side i = {B, S} does not expect side j = {B, S}, j 6= i,
to join platform Pp if side j gains negative payoffs from joining given that side i did not join.
In other words, given the contract, if there is an equilibrium in which neither side joins Pp,
such equilibrium is selected, even if there also exists another equilibrium in which both sides
join the platform.
The distinction between favorable and unfavorable beliefs may capture a difference in
agents’ ability to coordinate on joining an old or a new platform. If a certain platform is
a well-known, established incumbent that had a significant market share in the past, then
agents from one side of the market may believe that agents from the other side are most
likely to continue using this platform and will decide to join the incumbent based on this
belief. A new entrant, however, may find it more difficult to convince agents that agents
from the opposite side will also join.
2.1 Full Information
To illustrate the role that information plays in our model, consider first a full information
benchmark.
The objective of a platform is to maximize its profit. We assume that the platform does
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not bear any marginal cost. Therefore, the platform sets the contract to maximize
Π = FB + FS + tB(θ, c) + tS(θ, c) .
Suppose that θ and c are common knowledge from the beginning of the game, that is,
before the buyer and the seller join P . Then, both Po and Pp can implement the welfare-
maximizing outcome, q∗(θ, c), and earnW ∗(θ, c) — i.e., the whole social surplus — by offering
a contract {FS, FB, tS(θ, c), tB(θ, c), q(θ, c)} = {0, 0,−C(q∗(θ, c), c), V (q∗(θ, c), θ), q∗(θ, c)}.
In the case of Pp, both sides do not need to pay access fees, and as they can always refuse
to participate in the trading stage, they cannot lose from joining Pp. Thus, both sides join
the platform if the platform is Pp,
4 and clearly, they join the platform if it is Po.
Notice that the same argument holds if there is uncertainty but not asymmetric infor-
mation such that all players are uninformed about θ and c when they sign the contract,
but θ and c are ex-post observable and contractible. To conclude, under full information
or uncertainty (without ex-post asymmetric information) there is no difference between Po
and Pp.
2.2 Monopoly Platform under Ex-post Asymmetric Information
Contrary to the full information benchmark, for the remainder of the paper we suppose that
in the contracting stage no player knows θ and c, and that the buyer and the seller privately
observe θ and c, respectively, after joining the platform but before they decide whether to
trade or not. We consider a truthfully revealing mechanism in which the buyer and the seller
pays FS and FB for joining the platform, and then they are induced by the offered menu
to truthfully report θ and c, and trade at the level q(θ, c) with the payments tS(θ, c) and
tB(θ, c) to the platform.
Consider first the optimal contract for Po, a monopolistic platform facing favorable (op-
timistic) expectations. As the buyer and the seller have ex-post private information, Po will
have to leave the buyer and the seller with ex-post utility (gross of the access fees), i.e.,
information rents, to motivate them to truthfully reveal their private information. Standard
4We assume that if an agent is indifferent between joining or not, he joins the platform. If the indifference
is resolved otherwise, Pp needs to set one of the access fees to −ε, with ε positive but arbitrarily close to 0.
Then, in the limit Pp and Po offer the same contract, which results in the same outcome.
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calculations5 show that each side gains ex-post expected information rents of
UB(q, θ) = Ec
∫ θ
θ0
Vθ(q(θ¯, c), θ¯)dk(θ¯) , US(q, c) = Eθ
∫ c1
c
Cc(q(θ, c¯), c¯)dg(c¯) . (2)
To ensure that the buyer and the seller agree to trade after they joined the platform and
learned their private information we need
EctB(θ, c) = Ec
[
V (q(θ, c), θ)
]− UB(q, θ) , EθtS(θ, c) = −Eθ[C(q(θ, c), c)]− US(q, c) .
(3)
Conditions (2) and (3) along with the property that q(θ, c) is nondecreasing in θ and nonin-
creasing with c ensure that once the buyer and the seller joined Po and privately observed θ
and c, they will truthfully report it to Po. To make sure that both sides agree to participate
ex-ante, that is, before they learn their private information, the maximum access fees that
Po can charge are
FB = EθUB(q, θ) , FS = EcUS(q, c) . (4)
The platform has two sources of revenue: access fees and transaction fees. Therefore,
Po’s objective is to set q(θ, c) to maximize
Π = FB + FS + Eθ c
[
tB(θ, c) + tS(θ, c)
]
, (5)
subject to the constraints (2), (3), and (4). After substituting (2), (3), and (4) into (5)
and rearranging, we see that Po’s problem is to set q(θ, c) to maximize Eθ c
[
V (q(θ, c), θ) −
C(q(θ, c), c)
]
. Hence, Po will set q
∗(θ, c), and will be able to earn W ∗ = Eθ cW ∗(θ, c).
Intuitively, Po has to leave ex-post information rents to the two sides, but Po can charge
upfront access fees from the two sides that are equal to their expected ex-post information
rents. Therefore, Po has no incentive to distort the level of trade in order to reduce the
agents’ information rents.
Next, consider Pp, a platform facing unfavorable (pessimistic) beliefs of agents. The dif-
ference in beliefs results in different equilibrium contract, and different outcome. In order
to satisfy ex-post incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, the con-
straints (2) and (3) remain the same. The main difference is in FB and FS. While a Po
can charge positive FB and FS from both sides, Pp cannot. Given positive FB and FS, each
side loses if it pays access fees and the other side does not join. Therefore, under pessimistic
5See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). We use EX to denote the expectation with respect to variable X.
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beliefs with respect to Pp, both sides will prefer not to join Pp. Notice that this is indeed
rational for the two sides to do so given their expectations: Given that each side believes
that the other side does not join, both sides gain higher utility from not joining.
As a result, Pp needs to use a divide-and-conquer strategy, where it charges zero access
fee (or minimally negative) from one of the sides in order to attract it, and then charges
positive access fee from the other side. Platform Pp therefore has two options. The first
option is to attract the buyer by charging:
FB = 0 , FS = EcUS(q, c) . (6)
But now, after substituting (2), (3), and (6) into (5), Pp’s objective becomes to set q(θ, c) as
to maximize
Eθc
[
V (q(θ, c), θ)− C(q(θ, c), c)]− EθUB(q, θ) . (7)
Straightforward calculations show that the first order condition for the optimal level of trade
is characterized by
Vq(q(θ, c), θ) = Cq(q(θ, c), c) +
1−K(θ)
k(θ)
Vθq(q(θ, c), θ) . (8)
Let q˜B(θ, c) denote the solution to (8). It follows that q˜B(θ, c) < q
∗(θ, c) unless θ = θ1.
Intuitively, with pessimistic beliefs, when Pp attracts the buyer it cannot capture the buyer’s
information rents. Consequently, Pp distort the level of trade downward to reduce the buyer’s
information rents. To simplify the analysis we focus on the case where (1 − K(θ))/k(θ)
is sufficiently small such that q˜B(θ, c) > 0 for all θ and c. Moreover, notice that since
by assumption (1 − K(θ))/k(θ) is decreasing with θ, q˜B(θ, c) is increasing with θ which
ensures the incentive compatibility constraints. Therefore, Pp earns Eθc
[
V (q˜B(θ, c), θ) −
C(q˜B(θ, c), c)
]− EθUB(q˜B(θ, c), θ) when attracting the buyer.
Alternatively, Pp may attract the seller. Using the same logic as before, we find that Pp’s
profit in this case is Eθc
[
V (q˜S(θ, c), θ) − C(q˜S(θ, c), c)
] − EcUS(q˜S(θ, c), c), where q˜S(θ, c) is
the solution to
Vq(q(θ, c), θ) = Cq(q(θ, c), c) +
G(c)
g(c)
Ccq(q(θ, c), c) . (9)
It follows that q˜S(θ, c) < q
∗(θ, c) unless c = c0. Now Pp cannot capture S’s information rents
so once again it will distort the level of trade downward to reduce the seller’s information
rents. Again we focus on the case where G(c)/g(c) is sufficiently small such that q˜S(θ, c) > 0
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for all θ and c. Moreover notice that since by assumption G(c)/g(c) is increasing with c,
q˜S(θ, c) is decreasing with c which ensures the incentive compatibility constraints.
Next, we turn to compare between Pp’s two options. Let
∆ ≡ Eθc [V (q˜B(θ, c), θ)− C(q˜B(θ, c), c)− UB(q˜B(θ, c), θ)]−
− Eθc [V (q˜S(θ, c), θ)− C(q˜S(θ, c), c)− US(q˜S(θ, c), c)] .
The parameter ∆ measures the difference in the degree of ex-post asymmetric information
between the buyer and the seller. If ∆ > 0, then the information problem is stronger on
the seller side, in that Eθc [US(q, θ)] > Eθc [UB(q, c)] for all q. Conversely, when ∆ < 0,
the information problem is more prominent on the buyer’s side. As it turns out, ∆ plays
a crucial role in our analysis as it is convenient to characterize the equilibrium outcome of
the competitive case given ∆.6 To illustrate the intuition behind ∆, consider the following
example.
Example 1 (uniform distributions of types) Suppose that the buyer has linear demand
and the seller has linear costs such that V (q, θ) = θq− q2
2
and C(q, c) = cq. Also, suppose that
θ and c are distributed uniformly along the intervals [µθ−σθ, µθ+σθ] and [µc−σc, µc+σc]. The
parameters µθ and µc are the mean values of θ and c. The parameters σθ and σc measure the
degree to which Pp is uninformed about θ and c. To ensure that the market is fully covered,
suppose that µθ − µc > max{3σθ + σc, σθ + 3σc}. Then
σc > σθ =⇒ ∆ > 0 ,
σc < σθ =⇒ ∆ < 0 ,
σc = σθ =⇒ ∆ = 0 .
Given ∆, the solution for the monopoly case becomes evident: If ∆ > 0, platform Pp
prefers to attract the buyer by charging him zero — or minimally negative — access fee.
Conversely, for ∆ < 0, Pp prefers to attract the seller. Lemma 1 below is a direct consequence
of the discussion above.
6Even though the sign of the difference Eθc [US(q, θ)]−Eθc [UB(q, c)] determines the sign of ∆, for further
representation it is more convenient to characterize the solution in terms of ∆ instead of Eθc [US(q, θ)] −
Eθc [UB(q, c)].
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Lemma 1 Under asymmetric information, a monopolistic platform facing optimistic be-
liefs, Po sets the welfare-maximizing level of trade, q
∗. A monopolistic platform that faces
pessimistic beliefs, Pp, distorts the level of trade downward. Specifically,
(i) If ∆ > 0, then it is optimal for platform Pp to subsidize the buyer (FB = 0) and to set
q = q˜B(θ, c) < q
∗(θ, c).
(ii) If ∆ < 0, then it is optimal for platform Pp to subsidize the seller (FS = 0) and to set
q = q˜S(θ, c) < q
∗(θ, c).
(iii) It is optimal for platform Pp to set q = q
∗(θ, c) only if (1−K(θ))/k(θ) = G(c)/g(c) = 0
for all θ and c. In such a case, it earns W ∗.
As Lemma 1 reveals, divide-and-conquer strategy emerges in the context of this model
as a direct consequence of asymmetric information: Pp implements the trade maximizing q
∗
only if (1 −K(θ))/k(θ) = G(c)/g(c) = 0 for all θ and c. Moreover, Lemma 1 predicts that
Pp finds it optimal to attract the side with the lowest informational problem, in the sense
that this side is not expected to learn much about its value from trade after joining the
platform. If ∆ > 0, asymmetric information is stronger on the seller side. Consequently, Pp
has to leave higher ex-post information rents for the seller. Since under divide-and-conquer
Pp loses the expected information rents of the side that Pp subsidizes, it will choose to lose
the information rents of the buyer. The opposite case holds if asymmetric information is
stronger on the buyer side.
In the context of Example 1, Lemma 1 indicates that if σc > σθ, then the spread of the
potential realizations of c is wider than θ, implying that the informational problem is more
significant from the seller side. Consequently, ∆ > 0, so the platform attracts the buyer and
sets q˜B(θ, c). The opposite case holds when σc > σθ. Moreover, if σc = σθ = 0, then the
informational problem vanishes and platform Pp implements the welfare-maximizing level of
trade.
3 Competition between Platforms
In this section we consider platform competition. In contrast to the monopoly benchmark
in Section 2, we find that under competition the platform benefiting from favorable be-
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liefs sometimes also distorts downward the level of trade. This is the result of asymmetric
information.
Suppose that there are two platforms competing in the market. The platforms are undif-
ferentiated, except for the beliefs each is facing.7 We call one of the platforms incumbent (I),
and the other entrant (E). The incumbent benefits from favorable beliefs, in the same way
as Po, while the entrant faces unfavorable beliefs, in the same way as Pp. Because of the
favorable beliefs, both sides join the incumbent whenever it is an equilibrium, even if there
also exists an equilibrium where they both join the entrant. Conversely, both sides join the
entrant only when there is no other equilibrium.
Each platform sets contract ContP = {F PB , F PS , tPB(θ, c), tPS (θ, c), qP (θ, c)}, for P = I, E
with the objective to maximize its profit. We focus on a sequential game where the incumbent
announces its contract slightly before the entrant.8 Users decide which platform to join after
observing both contracts.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium. Given the incumbent’s strategy, ContI ,
the entrant has two options to win the market: one is to attract the buyer side, and the
other to attract the seller side. For tractability, for now on we refer to any q(θ, c) as just q,
whenever possible.
To attract the buyer under unfavorable beliefs, the entrant needs to charge
−FEB ' EθcUB(qI)− F IB , (10)
where EθcUB(qI) is the expected information rent that the buyer obtains from the incumbent
if both sides join the incumbent under ContI , and symbol ' stands for “slightly greater but
almost equal.” Condition (10) ensures that even when the buyer believes that the seller joins
the incumbent, the buyer still prefers to join the entrant. Therefore, when condition (10)
is satisfied, there is no equilibrium in which both sides join the incumbent. Given that the
buyer joins the entrant independently of the seller, the seller finds it attractive to join the
7Both platforms use the same technology. We onsider the case of different technologies and the adoption
of new technologies in Section 5.
8We analyze a simultaneous game between the two platforms in Appendix A. There we show that,
for some parameter values there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game. Where
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists for the simultaneous game, it has similar qualitative features as
subgame perfect equilibrium in the sequential game considered here. To generate clean and tractable results
we therefore focus on the sequential game.
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entrant when
−FES + EθcUS(qE) ' −min{F IS , 0} . (11)
Given constraints (10) and (11), the entrant who attracts the buyer earns at most
ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) = Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]−EθcUB(qI , θ)+F IB+min{F IS , 0} ,
where q˜B is the same as q maximizing (7).
It is possible, however, that the entrant prefers to attract the seller side. Applying the
same logic and replacing the buyer with the seller, we find that the entrant earns
ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) = Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]−EθcUS(qI , c)+F IS+min{F IB, 0} .
Knowing the subsequent strategies of the entrant, the incumbent sets its contract to
maximize the expected profit. However, the incumbent needs to account for several con-
straints. First, the incumbent must assure that the entrant has no profitable way of winning
the market. That is, whether the entrant aims at attracting the buyer or the seller, it does
not earn positive profit. Second, the incumbent also needs to take into account that the
buyer or the seller may prefer to stay out of either platforms if the access fees are too high.9
As the entrant’s profits reveal, asymmetric information hurts the entrant. When the
expected information rents are sufficiently high, the entrant does not impose significant
competitive pressure on the incumbent. To rule out this uninteresting possibility, we adopt
the Spulber (1988) condition that ensures that a mechanism designer can implement the
welfare-maximizing quantity while maintaining a balanced budget10
Eθc
[
V (q∗(θ, c), θ)− C(q∗(θ, c), c)− UB(q∗, θ)− US(q∗, c)
]
> 0 . (12)
Under the assumptions of Example 1, condition (12) is satisfied for any parameter values as
long as q∗ is always positive. The proof of Proposition 1 below shows that with condition (12),
the entrant forces the incumbent to set negative access fees to one of the sides. This may
lead the incumbent to distort its quantity downward.
9The formal statement of the incumbent’s maximization problem, including the constraints, is included
in the proof of Proposition 1.
10This condition is equivalent to condition (6) in Spulber (1988), which is a modification of Myerson-
Satterthwaite condition for continuous q. Notice that unlike Spulber’s model, here this is not a necessary
condition for a monopoly incumbent to implement the efficient level of trade, because we assume that the
two sides are initially uninformed about their types.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that ∆ ≥ 0. In equilibrium, the incumbent always dominates the
market and attracts the buyer (by charging F IB < 0), while extracting all the seller’s expected
information rents through F IS . Moreover,
(i) If ∆ > Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)], then the entrant also attracts the buyer (FEB < 0) and sets
qE = q˜B. The incumbent sets the welfare-maximizing quantity, q
I = q∗, and earns
ΠI = Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
(ii) If 0 ≤ ∆ < Eθc[UB(q˜B, θ)] then the entrant attracts the seller (FES ≤ 0) and sets
qE = q˜S. The incumbent distorts the quantity downward to q
I = q˜B, and earns Π
I = ∆.
(iii) If Eθc[UB(q˜B, θ)] ≤ ∆ ≤ Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)], then the entrant is indifferent between attracting
the buyer or the seller. The incumbent distorts the quantity downward to qI = ˜˜q∆, where
˜˜q∆ is an increasing function of ∆ with values ˜˜q∆ ∈ [q˜B, q∗]. Moreover, the incumbent
earns
ΠI = Eθc
[
V (˜˜q∆, θ)− C(˜˜q∆, c)
]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
The case where ∆ < 0 is similar, with the buyer replacing seller (see Figure 1 for a full
characterization of the equilibrium).11
Proof. See Appendix, page 40.
Proposition 1 offers several interesting observations. The first observation concerns the
equilibrium level of trade set by the dominant platform, the incumbent. If the difference in
the degree of ex-post asymmetric information between the sides, ∆, is large such that ∆ >
Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)], then the incumbent sets the welfare-maximizing quantity as in the monopoly
case. However, if the difference is small, even though the incumbent benefits from favorable
beliefs, the incumbent distorts the trade downward. For Eθc[UB(q˜B, θ)] ≤ ∆ ≤ Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)],
this distortion becomes stronger the smaller ∆ is. This result is surprising as it shows that
competition actually reduces social welfare in comparison with a monopoly. More precisely,
11The proposition describes subgame perfect equilibrium in sequential game. In a simultaneous game,
the unique Nash equilibrium is the same as the subgame perfect equilibrium in sequential game when
∆ > Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)]. However, for ∆ ≤ Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)], there does not exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in the simultaneous move game (see Proposition 5 in Appendix A).
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∆0
Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)]
Eθc[UB(q˜B, θ)]
The incumbent attracts the buyer while the entrant attracts the seller.
The incumbent sets qI = q˜B < q
∗.
The incumbents attracts the buyer, and the entrant is indifferent between
attracting the seller or the buyer.
The incumbent sets qI = ˜˜q∆ < q
∗.
Both platforms attract the buyer.
The incumbent sets qI = q∗.
Eθc[US(q∗, θ)]
Eθc[US(q˜S, θ)]
The incumbent attracts the seller while the entrant attracts the buyer.
The incumbent sets qI = q˜S < q
∗.
The incumbents attracts the seller, and the entrant is indifferent between
attracting the seller or the buyer.
The incumbent sets qI = ˜˜q∆ < q
∗.
Both platforms attract the seller.
The incumbent sets qI = q∗.
Figure 1: Properties of the equilibrium in sequential game, depending on the value of ∆.
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the presence of competitive threat (even if not an active competitor) increases the customer
surplus for some customers, while creating a dead-weight loss.
The intuition for this result is the following. Suppose that, ∆ > 0, and therefore the
informational problem is more significant on the seller’s side. As in the monopoly benchmark,
this creates an incentive to attract the buyer and extract all the seller’s information rents.
Now, if ∆ is sufficiently large, then this incentive is strong and both platforms compete on
attracting the buyer, while extracting all the seller’s information rents. If however ∆ is not
too large, then this incentive still prevails but it is weaker, and therefore the incumbent
attracts the buyer and extracts all the seller’s rent; but, now the entrant prefers to attract
the seller.
When the platforms compete on different sides of the market, neither of them can extract
the information rents from both sides of the market. In consequence, also the incumbent
distorts the level of trade downward. To see why, note that if both platforms compete
on the buyer’s side, then the incumbent extract the entire seller’s rent. Moreover, as the
buyer expects the seller to joint the incumbent, the buyer expects to gain positive rents
from joining the incumbent, implying that the incumbent internalizes the buyer’s rents as
well. Formally, the buyer will join the incumbent as long as −FEB / EθcUB(qI) − F IB, or
F IB / EθcUB(qI)+FEB . Consequently, the incumbent internalizes the rents of both sides, and
as in the monopoly case, will set the welfare-maximizing quantity. If however the incumbent
attracts the buyer while the entrant attracts the seller, then the incumbent extracts the
entire seller’s rent, but the entrant provides the seller with a subsidy, FES / 0. This implies
that now the buyer expects the seller to join the entrant, and therefore the buyer will not
expect to gain any rents from joining the incumbent. Formally, in this case the buyer joins
the incumbent as long as −F IB / EθcUB(qE)−FEB , or F IB / −EθcUB(qE)+FEB . Consequently,
now the incumbent can only internalize the seller’s rents, and therefore distorts the level of
trade in order to reduce the buyer’s rents.
The second observation concerns the incumbent’s equilibrium profit. If the difference in
the degree of ex-post asymmetric information is large such that ∆ > Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)], then the
incumbent earns the difference between the Po’s and the Pp’s profits under monopoly. Notice
that this difference is higher the higher are the information rents that the entrant cannot
extract from the buyer: EθcUB(q˜B, θ). Hence, the incumbent’s profit approaches zero at the
limit as EθcUB(q˜B, θ) → 0. This result implies that the incumbent gains more competitive
advantage the larger is the informational problem from the buyer’s side. However, if ∆ is
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sufficiently small (i.e., 0 < ∆ < Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)]), the incumbent gains a higher profit the
higher is the difference in the ex-post asymmetric information problem of the two sides, ∆,
and the incumbent’s profit approaches zero at the limit as ∆→ 0.
Notice that the special case of ∆ = 0 may occur even if the distributions of types, K(θ)
and G(c), are not degenerate, i.e., there is uncertainty and asymmetric information. In
the assumptions of Example 1, this will occur if σc = σθ even though σc and σθ might be
significantly large. When this is the case, both platforms distort their quantities downward:
the incumbent to q˜B and the entrant to q˜S. And since ∆ = 0, both platforms earn no profit.
However, when the type distribution is degenerate on (at least) one side of the mar-
ket, both platforms set the trade-maximizing q∗ and earn zero profits. Therefore, without
uncertainty on both sides, the market behaves as in Caillaud and Jullien (2001 and 2003).
Corollary 1 Suppose that there is no uncertainty on the buyer side, i.e., (1−K(θ))/k(θ) = 0
for all θ. Then, for ∆ ≥ 0, qI = qE = q∗ and both platforms earn zero profits. The same
market outcome occurs for G(c)/g(c) = 0 and ∆ ≤ 0.
Proof. See Appendix, page 45.
The result of our Proposition 1 differs from Proposition 2 in Caillaud and Jullien (2001)
and Proposition 1 in Caillaud and Jullien (2003). The propositions in Caillaud and Jullien
papers show that undifferentiated platforms competing with both access fees and transac-
tion fees make zero profit. In these papers, with no differentiation, the two platforms set
the highest possible transaction fees and then compete in access fees (as in Bertrand com-
petition), resulting in zero profits. Since Caillaud and Jullien do not assume asymmetric
information in their papers, Corollary 1 is consistent with their results. The result of our
Proposition 1 contributes to the above papers by showing that asymmetric information re-
stores the incumbent’s competitive advantage and enables the incumbent to earn positive
payoff even without product differentiation.
4 Application: Multi-homing and Exclusive Dealing
In this section, we extend the competition model from Section 3 by allowing one of the sides
to “multi-home” by joining both platforms. This raises the question of whether a platform
may want to restrict the agent’s ability to join the competing platform by imposing exclusive
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dealing. This question has important implications for antitrust policy toward such exclusive
arrangements.
As we show in this section, the equilibrium under multi-homing differs from single-homing
only for some cases. For those cases, the multi-homing equilibrium yields efficient levels of
trade (welfare-maximizing q∗), while in the single-homing equilibrium the trade levels are
distorted downward. Moreover, in those cases, the incumbent prefers the multi-homing equi-
librium. However, if the incumbent plays as in the multi-homing equilibrium, the entrant’s
best response is to impose exclusive dealing. This, in effect, leads to the single-homing
equilibrium.
Suppose that it is the seller who can join more than one platform.12 A third-party video
game developer, for example, can choose to write a video game for more than one console.
A smartphone application developer can choose to write an application compatible with
more than one operating system. We focus on multi-homing coming from only one side of
the market following the observation that in many markets usually there is only one side
that can choose to join more than one platform. Smartphone users, for example, usually
do not carry more than one smartphone. Likewise, videogame players usually buy only one
console.13
As before, we assume that the incumbent announces its contract to both sides slightly
earlier than the entrant, and the two sides simultaneously decide to which platform to join
after observing contracts offered by both platforms. If the seller indeed joins both platforms,
the buyer may join either the incumbent or the entrant. If both these situations constitute
an equilibrium, then the equilibrium where the buyer joins the incumbent is played, since
the incumbent enjoys favorable beliefs. The entrant can succeed in attracting both sides of
the market only if it ensures that the equilibrium with the buyer and the seller joining the
incumbent does not exist while also ensuring that there is an equilibrium in which both sides
join the entrant.
12The situation where only buyer multi-homes is symmetric. Our analysis, where only the seller multi-
homes, is conducted for all values of ∆. If the buyer multi-homes under ∆ > 0, it equivalent to seller
multi-homing under ∆ < 0.
13Indeed, in the above examples even users can potentially join more than one platform, but for the most
part they choose not to do so for exogenous, not strategic, reasons. Smartphone users, for example, may
find it cumbersome to carry more than one smartphone with them. Likewise, gamers may find it difficult
to store more than one videogame console with all the relevant accessories. We take these constraints as
exogenous and therefore assume that buyers cannot multi-home.
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To be successful in the market, the entrant needs to attract (by subsidizing) one of the
sides. It has two options: to attract the buyer, or to attract the seller. The entrant can
attract the buyer by charging
−FEB ' EθcUB(qI , θ)− F IB =⇒ FEB = F IB − EθcUB(qI , θ) .
This condition is identical to the single-homing case because by assumption a buyer
cannot multi-home. Given that the buyer joins the entrant, the seller will join as well if only
the entrant provides him with a non-negative expected payoff. This is different from the
single-homing case, where the entrant had to compete with the seller’s expected payoff from
joining the incumbent. Hence
−FES + EθcUS(qE, c) ' 0 =⇒ FES = EθcUS(qE, c) .
Notice that now FES differs from the case of single-homing in that the incumbent’s offer
to the seller does not affect the seller’s decision to join the entrant, because the seller can
multi-home and therefore it joins the entrant whenever doing so provides positive payoff.
The entrant’s profit function when attracting the buyer is
ΠE(attracting B|qE) = Eθc
[
V (qE, θ)− C(qE, c)− UB(qE, θ)
]
+ F IB − EθcUB(qI , θ) ,
maximized by qE = q˜B.
Next, suppose that the entrant chooses to attract the seller. Given unfavorable beliefs
against the entrant, the entrant needs to make it worthwhile for the seller to join even if the
buyer would not join. That is, the entrant needs to set −FES ' 0, which we approximate
by FES = 0. This is again because the seller can always join both platforms and therefore
the incumbent’s offer to the seller does not affect the seller’s decision on whether to join the
entrant. Given FES = 0, the buyer now expects the seller to join both platforms, and therefore
will agree to join the entrant only if it offers him a larger surplus. Notice that with the seller
joining both platforms, the coordination problem for the buyer weakens significantly. He
knows that he will trade, no matter which platform he joins, because the seller is present on
both. The buyer prefers to join th entrant when
EθcUB(qE, θ)− FEB ' EθcUB(qI , θ)− F IB =⇒ FEB = EθcUB(qE, θ)− EθcUB(qI , θ) + F IB.
(13)
This condition differs from the single-homing case. To see the intuition behind this
condition, notice that if EθcUB(qE)− FEB ≤ EθcUB(qI)− F IB, then there is an equilibrium in
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which the seller joins both platforms while the buyer joins only the incumbent. As beliefs
are unfavorable against the entrant, the two sides of the market will play this equilibrium
and as FES = 0, the entrant will not make positive profit. Condition (13) ensures that the
buyer prefers to join the entrant even if he believes that the seller joined both platforms.
The entrant’s profit is maximized for qE = q˜S, and yields
ΠE(attracting S|q˜S(θ, c)) = Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + F IB − EθcUB(qI , θ) .
A direct comparison of the entrant’s profits under the two scenarios reveals that the
entrant attracts the buyer when ∆ > 0, and attracts the seller when ∆ < 0, independently
of the incumbent’s strategy.14
The incumbent’s objective is to maximize its profit, under the constraints that winning
the market is not profitable for the entrant, and both the buyer and the seller prefer to join
the incumbent than to stay out of the market.15
Proposition 2 Suppose that the seller can multihome by joining both platforms. Then, in
the equilibrium of the sequential game:
(i) If ∆ > 0, then the incumbent sets qI = q∗, F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]+
EθcUB(q∗, θ), F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c) and earns
ΠI(q∗) = Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
(ii) If ∆ < 0, then the incumbent sets qI = q∗, F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]+
EθcUB(q∗, θ), F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c) and earns:
ΠI(q∗) = Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] .
Proof. See Appendix, page 45.
Comparing Proposition 2 with Proposition 1 reveals that with multi-homing, the in-
cumbent always offers the welfare-maximizing quantity regardless of ∆, thus the market is
always efficient. Intuitively, if the entrant chooses to attract the seller but the seller can
multi-home, then the buyer still gains the payoff EθcUB(qI , θ) − F IB from staying with the
14For ∆ = 0, the entrant is indifferent between attracting the buyer or the seller.
15This optimization problem is formally stated in the proof of Proposition 2.
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incumbent because the seller joined both platforms. As the buyer still benefits from the
presence of the seller in the incumbent’s platform, the entrant needs to charge the buyer
a lower access price in order to convince the buyer to sign with the entrant. This in turn
reduces the entrant’s profit from attracting the seller to begin with, and therefore enables
the incumbent to dominate the market without distorting its quantity.
Given that now we have characterized the equilibrium under multi-homing, for the re-
mainder of this section we will analyze each platform’s incentives to prevent multi-homing. A
platform can prevent multi-homing by imposing exclusive dealing restriction. For example, a
videogame console manufacturer can impose exclusive dealing on third-party developer that
prevents developers from dealing with competing manufacturers. In other cases, a platform
can use indirect ways for preventing multi-homing, by making their platform incompati-
ble with other platforms and therefore imposing additional cost on the agent’s ability to
multi-home.
In the context of our model, the platforms’ profits and q in an equilibrium with multi-
homing are the same as under single-homing for ∆ ≥ Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] or ∆ ≤ −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)].
Therefore, we focus our analysis of exclusivity on the case where −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ <
Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)].
We first show in Lemma 2 that if exclusive dealing is possible, then there is no multi-
homing equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Suppose that −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] and that platforms can im-
pose exclusive dealing. Then, the incumbent earns higher profit in the multi-homing equi-
librium than in the single-homing equilibrium. However, given that the incumbent sets the
multi-homing strategies, the entrant finds it optimal to impose exclusive dealing, and by doing
so is able to dominate the market with positive profit.
Proof. See Appendix, page 46.
Lemma 2 shows that while the incumbent benefits from multi-homing, the entrant will
respond to the incumbent’s multi-homing strategy by imposing exclusive dealing. This in
turn means that it is not optimal for the incumbent to set the multi-homing strategies to
begin with. The intuition for this result is as follows: Multi-homing provides the entrant with
an advantage and a disadvantage over single-homing. In comparison with single-homing, it
is easier for the entrant to attract the seller under multi-homing because the seller can join
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both platforms, and therefore joins the entrant as long as the seller gains non-negative payoff.
At the same time, it is more difficult for the entrant to attract the buyer under multi-homing
for the same reason: If the buyer expects the seller to join both platforms, the entrant needs
to leave the buyer with higher payoff to motivate the buyer to choose the entrant over the
incumbent. In the multi-homing equilibrium, the incumbent eliminates the former, positive
effect of multi-homing on the entrant by providing the seller with zero payoff. In such a case,
the seller’s incentive to join the entrant becomes the same under single- and multi-homing.
Then, the incumbent can amplify the latter, negative effect of multi-homing by offering a low,
possibly negative access fees to the buyer. As the incumbent turns the multi-homing effects
against the entrant, the entrant would like to correct this by imposing exclusive dealing.
Next, we establish that in equilibrium, the two platforms indeed play their single-homing
strategies and at least one of them imposes exclusive dealing.
Proposition 3 Suppose that −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] and that platforms can
impose exclusive dealing. Then, in equilibrium,
(i) If 0 ≤ ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)], then the incumbent sets the single-homing strategy but does
not need to impose exclusive dealing. Given the incumbent’s strategy, the entrant earns
zero profit if it imposes exclusive dealing, and negative profit otherwise.
(ii) If −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ ≤ 0, then the incumbent sets the single-homing strategy and
imposes exclusive dealing. The entrant then plays its single-homing strategy and earns
zero profit.
Proof. See Appendix, page 48.
Proposition 3 reveals that if the informational problem is more significant on the seller’s
side (0 ≤ ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]), then the incumbent does not directly impose exclusive
dealing, though the entrant’s ability to impose exclusivity forces the incumbent to set the
single-homing strategies. If however the informational problem is more significant on the
buyer’s side −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ ≤ 0), then the incumbent will also need to impose exclusive
dealing. Intuitively, in the later case, under single-homing, the incumbent attracts the seller
while the entrant attracts the buyer and earns zero profit. If the incumbent would not impose
exclusivity in this case, then the entrant finds it optimal to also attract the seller, and win
the market. To prevent this, the incumbent imposes exclusive dealing in equilibrium.
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Next, consider the effect of exclusive dealing on welfare. Recall that if −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] <
∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)], then Proposition 2 reveals that the single-homing strategies involve a
downward distortion in the quantity, while Proposition 3 reveals that under multi-homing
the incumbent always sets the welfare-maximizing quantity. Since the platforms’ ability to
impose exclusive dealing forces them to play the single-homing strategies, it also forces the
incumbent to distort the quantity downward. Following Corollary 2 summarizes this finding.
Corollary 2 Suppose that −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]. Then, the platform’s
ability to impose exclusive dealing reduces social welfare.
For antitrust policy, this result supports a restrictive approach by antitrust authorities
against exclusive dealing.
We conclude this section by highlighting the role that asymmetric information plays in the
analysis. Notice that without any asymmetric information, both platforms earn zero profits
under both single- and multi-homing. Therefore, the incumbent loses all the advantages of
multi-homing, while the entrant has nothing to gain by imposing exclusive dealing. Since
the equilibria under multi- and single-homing are the same, no platform has incentive to
impose exclusivity or seek multi-homing.
5 Application: Technology Choice under Platform Com-
petition
In this section, we explore a scenario where the two competing platforms choose between an
incremental or radically innovative technology before they compete on prices. Suppose that
there is a preliminary stage to the pricing game described in Section 3. In this preliminary
stage the platforms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose which of the two available
new technologies to adopt.16 The technologies differ in their expected benefits and the
probability with which they succeed. The benefits of a new technology are realized by
increasing the value, V , across the buyer types, and by decreasing the cost, C, across the
seller types. One of the new technologies is an incremental technology: It certainly succeeds,
but offers small expected benefit. One can think of it as an upgrade of an existing technology.
16Not adopting either of the new technologies is a dominated strategy, as it leads surely to demise of the
platform.
27
The other technology is a radically innovative technology, which may fail or succeed with
a certain probability. But if successful, the radical technology provides significantly higher
benefits to the buyer and the seller than the incremental technology.
We show that if the radical technology is very risky (has a low probability of success),
then there is a unique equilibrium where the incumbent chooses the incremental technol-
ogy while the entrant chooses the radical technology. The opposite case occurs when the
radical technology has a high probability of success. Moreover, the above result is a direct
consequence of the presence of asymmetric information: Under full information there are
two equilibria, in which the two platforms choose different technologies, regardless of the
probability of success of the radical technology. Consequently, the presence of asymmet-
ric information can explain why it is the entrants who choose the most radical and risky
technologies.
5.1 Game of Technology Choice
Before deciding on its pricing, each platform chooses a technology. There are two technologies
for the platforms to choose from. We assume that there are no costs to implement either
technology. However, the two technologies differ in the benefits and in the probability of
success. One technology is incremental, denoted by E . This technology generates V E and
CE with certainty. The other technology is radically innovative, which we also call radical
and denote by R. The radical technology is successful with some probability ρ. When it is
successful, it generates V H and CH such that for any θ and q, V H(q, θ) > V E(q, θ), and for
any c and q, CH(q, c) < CE(q, c). With probability 1 − ρ, the radical technology fails, and
generates V L = 0 for any θ and q. That is, if the radical technology fails, no agents join the
platform that has adopted it. Notice that in comparison with the incremental technology,
the radical technology is more risky if ρ is sufficiently low, as it is more likely that the
incremental technology will turn out to be better than the radical technology. The opposite
case occurs when ρ is sufficiently close to 1, in which case the incremental technology is the
more risky one as it is more likely that the radical technology will turn out to be better than
the incremental technology. In our analysis we provide a solution for all possible values of ρ.
The game has two stages. In the first stage, the platforms simultaneously choose a
technology. If any platform chose the radical technology, at the end of the first stage it is
(publicly) known if the technology was successful or not. In the second stage, knowing the
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technology choices, the platforms play a simultaneous pricing game similar to the one in
Section 3. To assure that all possible second-stage subgames have unique Nash equilibria
in pure strategies, we assume that ∆T > EθcUTB (q∗(T ), c) for T = E ,H, where q∗(T ) is the
trade-maximizing quantity under technology T = E ,H.17, 18
We begin by considering only those situations when both platforms implement the same
technology. We assume that the radical technology turns out to be successful or not, inde-
pendently of which platform decided to implement it. If both platforms adopt the radical
technology, they either both succeed or both fail. Hence, the profits of the platforms when
both implement the same technology directly follows from our analysis of competition in
Section 3.
When both platforms choose the radical technology, and the technology fails, neither
makes any profit. When they both succeed, they earn:
ΠI(H,H) = Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)− CH(q∗(H), c)]− Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)− CH(q˜B(H), c)− UHB (q˜B(H), θ)] ,
ΠE(H,H) = 0 .
When both platforms choose the incremental technology E , they earn:
ΠI(E , E) = Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)]− Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ)− CE(q˜B(E), c)− UEB(q˜B(E), θ)] ,
ΠE(E , E) = 0.
We turn now to the situations where platforms chose different technologies. First, con-
sider the case where the incumbent chooses E and the entrant chooses R. If the radical
technology fails, then ΠE(E ,L) = 0; moreover, the incumbent becomes the monopolist plat-
form facing optimistic expectations, i.e., Po from the Section 2, and earns
ΠI(E ,L) = Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)] .
If the radical technology is successful, then the entrant can dominate the market as
long as the quality of the successful innovative technology is sufficiently high. The result of
17Similarly to the derivations in Section 3, q˜B(T ) is a function q(θ, c) maximizing
Eθc
[
V T (q(θ, c), θ)− CT (q(θ, c), c)] − EθUTB (q, θ), where UTB (q, θ) = Ec ∫ θθ0 V Tθ (q(θ¯, c), θ¯)dk(θ¯), while
q∗(T ) maximizes Eθc
[
V T (q(θ, c), θ)− CT (q(θ, c), c)], etc.
18The assumption of sufficiently large ∆ assures that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the
simultaneous pricing game, and is the same as the subgame perfect equilibrium in the sequential game (see
Proposition 1(i) and footnote 11).
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Lemma 3 uses similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 to find a condition for such
an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the incumbent chose the incremental technology while the entrant
chose the radically innovative technology. When the innovative technology is successful and
ΠE(E ,H) = Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)−CH(q˜B(H), c)−UHB (q˜B(H), θ)]−Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)−CE(q∗(E), c)] > 0,
(14)
then there is a unique equilibrium where the incumbent earns ΠI(E ,H) = 0 and the entrant
earns ΠE(E ,H).
Proof. See Appendix, page 49.
Now, suppose that the incumbent chooses the radical technology R, while the entrant
chooses E . If the radical technology fails, the incumbent does not make any profit, ΠI(L, E) =
0, and the entrant becomes the monopolist facing pessimistic beliefs, i.e., Pp in Section 2.
Therefore, the entrant earns ΠE(L, E) = Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ) − CE(q˜B(E), c) − UEB(q˜B(E), θ)] .
The outcome of the market in case the radical technology succeeds is presented in Lemma 4.
This result is obtained by similar arguments as in the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the entrant chose the incremental technology while the incumbent
chose the radically innovative technology. When the innovative technology is successful, in
the unique equilibrium the entrant does not earn any profit, ΠE(H, E) = 0. The incumbent
earns
ΠI(H, E) = Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)−CH(q∗(H), c)]−Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ)−CE(q˜B(E), c)−UEB(q˜B(E), θ)] .
Proof. It follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1(i).
5.2 Equilibrium in the Technology Choice Game
Given the platforms’ profits in the pricing game under different technology adoption sce-
narios, we can put together the payoffs in the first stage of the game, i.e., in the stage of
technology choice. Given the payoffs when the radical technology is successful and when it
fails, the expected payoffs from choosing each technology are represented in Table 1.
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E R
E ΠI(E , E), 0 (1−ρ) ΠI(E ,L), ρ ΠE(E ,H)
R ρ ΠI(H, E), (1−ρ) ΠE(L, E) ρ ΠI(H,H), 0
Table 1: Expected payoff matrix in technology adoption game. The incumbent is the row
player, and the entrant is the column player.
We can see from that payoff matrix that the entrant’s best response is always to adopt a
different technology than the incumbent. Consider now the incumbent’s best response. Un-
like the entrant, the incumbent does not need to avoid competition in the same technologies.
Proposition 4 identifies Nash equilibria in this game, and Figure 2 illustrates the result.
Proposition 4 In the two-stage technology adoption game, there are two cutoffs, ρ and ρ,
where 0 ≤ρ< ρ ≤ 1, such that:
(i) If ρ ∈ [0,ρ], (the radical technology is highly risky), there is a unique Nash equilibrium
where the incumbent chooses the incremental technology while the entrant chooses the
radical technology.
(ii) If ρ ∈ [ρ, 1] (the radical technology is almost not risky), there is a unique Nash equilib-
rium where the incumbent chooses the radical technology while the entrant chooses the
incremental technology.
(iii) If ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ], there are two Nash equilibria in which the two platforms choose different
technologies.
Proof. See Appendix, page 51.
Proposition 4 reveals that if the radical technology is either extremely risky or almost not
risky, (i.e., when ρ is either very low or very high), it is always the incumbent that chooses
the safer technology while the entrant chooses the riskier one. Only if there is no such clear
distinction (i.e., intermediate values of ρ), there are two equilibria. This result, however,
relays on the presence of asymmetric information. To see why, notice that if there is no
informational problem, i.e., (1−k(θ))/K(θ) = G(c)/g(c) = 0 for all θ and c, then ΠI(E , E) =
ΠI(H,H) = 0. Corollary 3 below follows directly from the proof of Proposition 4.
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Corollary 3 Suppose that there is no informational problem ((1 − k(θ))/K(θ) −→ 0 and
G(c)/g(c) −→ 0 ). Then, ρ−→ 0, ρ −→ 1, and there are two Nash equilibria in which the
two platforms choose different technologies for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 3 shows that without the informational problem, either platform may choose
the radical (or the incremental) technology for all values of ρ. Therefore, the presence
of the informational problem is crucial for the result that it is only the incumbent that
chooses the safer technology and only the entrant that chooses the risky one. Intuitively,
the informational problem is responsible for creating the incumbent’s advantage over the
entrant when they both choose the same technology. This forces the entrant to take risks
that an incumbent would not take. In fact, the proof of Proposition 4 implies that as the
informational problem becomes stronger (i.e., (1−k(θ))/K(θ) and G(c)/g(c) become larger),
then ρ increases, ρ decreases and therefore the set of parameters in which there is a unique
equilibrium increases.
The results of this section can explain why an entrant is more willing to take the chance
in adopting a new and unfamiliar (i.e., very risky) technology, and how this incentive is
driven by the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information. In particular, the success
ρ
0
1
ρ
ρ
unique equilibrium:
the incumbent chooses the incremental technology
and the entrant chooses the radical technology
two symmetric equilibria:
platforms choose different technologies
unique equilibrium:
the incumbent chooses the radical technology and
the entrant chooses the incremental technology
Figure 2: Possible equilibria in the technology choice game, depending on the value of ρ.
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probability of the innovative technology and the informational problem can be interpreted
as two sources of uncertainty in this competitive environment. The former is the uncertainty
affecting mainly the platform, while the latter is mainly affecting the agents.19 The results
in this section show that the incumbent prefers to put less uncertainty on itself and more
on the agents (i.e., it goes for the innovative technology only if there is high enough success
probability, but it does not mind large informational problem for the agents), while the
entrant does the opposite.
6 Conclusion
This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market when agents do not know
their valuations from joining the platform and they privately learn this information only
after they join. The paper shows that this informational problem significantly affects pricing,
profits, and market efficiency.
In our main result we show that the dominant platform may distort the level of trade
(measured by quantity or quality) downward in comparison with the level of trade that
maximizes social welfare. A monopoly facing the same informational problem does not
distort the level of trade, and under competition with full information, again there is no
distortion. Therefore, it is the combination of the informational problem and the presence
of competition that creates the market inefficiency.
We use the main result in two applications: Our first application concerns multi-homing.
We find that the incumbent platform earns higher profit under multi-homing, and multi-
homing eliminates the incumbent’s need to distort the level of trade downward. However,
if possible, the entrant prefers to prevent agents from multi-homing by imposing exclusive
dealing or making the technologies of the two platforms incompatible. In the context of this
model, exclusive dealing decreases social welfare because it forces the incumbent to distort
the level of trade.
The second application concerns the adoption of a new technology. We find that an
entrant platform who suffers from unfavorable beliefs is more likely to adopt an innovative,
but highly risky technology, while and incumbent is more likely to adopt a safer technology.
This result again emerges because of the informational problem: If the two platforms adopt
the same technology, the incumbent dominates the market and earns positive payoff because
19Of course, both types of uncertainly affect agents and platforms directly or indirectly.
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of asymmetric information (under full information, both platforms earn zero profits). The
only way an entrant can dominate the market is by offering a new and highly innovative
technology that, should it turned out to be successful, will enable the entrant to overcome
the informational problem.
Our paper is derived under some simplifying assumptions that are worth mentioning.
First, we assume that the platform can fully regulate the trade between the two sides in that
the contract specifies the quantity and prices. This assumption might be suitable in some
cases. Operating systems and manufacturers of videogames for example, sometimes regulate
the quality of independent developers. In other cases, however, a platform’s contracting
possibilities might be more limited. Assuming a platform that can fully regulate the trade
enables us to generate clean results and highlight the net effect of asymmetric information on
the market’s outcome and efficiency. It also allows us to separate the efficiency resulting from
asymmetric information from inefficiency that may result from other contract structures.
In accompanying research, we investigate platform competition with limited contracting
possibilities.
Second, we assume that there is only one agent on each side (i.e., one buyer and one
seller). The results should follow for more than one agent on each side as long as there is no
negative externalities within each group and as long as the valuations of the agents in the
same side are independently drown (that is, θ and c are not correlated among different buyers
and sellers, respectively). Introducing negative externalities within each side (for example,
because of competition between sellers), might change our results if it may make it easier
for the entrant to gain market share. Likewise, allowing for correlation in agents’ valuations
may affect the result as it may make it easier for the platform to extract private information
from agents. We leave these potential extensions of our model for future research.
Appendix
A Competition under Simultaneous Move Game
In Section 3 we have analyzed a game of competition between the incumbent and the entrant
platform, where the incumbent announced its contract slightly earlier than the entrant. In
this section, we consider a version of the competition game, where the incumbent and the
entrant announce their contracts simultaneously. In such a game we look for pure strategy
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Nash equilibria. We show that for ∆ such that −EθcUS(q∗, c) < ∆ < EθcUB(q∗, θ), there
does not exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. And otherwise there always exists a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Just as in the monopoly case and in the sequential move game, the entrant needs to
subsidize one side of the market to attract the agents. The entrant either subsidizes the
buyer or the seller. Suppose first, that the entrant subsidizes the buyer. By similar reasoning
as in Section 3, we find that the entrant’s best response to the incumbent’s contract involves
−FEB ' EθcUB(qI , θ)− F IB
−FES + EθcUS(qE, c) ' 0 .
Then the entrant’s profit function becomes Eθc
[
V (qE, θ) − C(qE, c) − UB(qE, θ)
]
+ F IB −
EθcUB(qI , θ) + min{F IS , 0}, which is maximized by qE = q˜B.
At the same time, the incumbent’s best response to entrant’s strategy of attracting the
buyer involves
−F IB + EθcUB(qI , θ) ' −FEB
−F IS + EθcUS(qI , c) ' 0 .
Then the incumbent’s profit function becomes Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)−C(qI , c)]+ FEB , which is max-
imized by qI = q∗. Moreover, F IS = EθcUS(q∗). The incumbent sets F IB low enough to
deter the entrant from the market (but not lower, because it would decrease the incumbent’s
profit), i.e., to set the entrant’s profit to 0. The incumbent achieves this by setting
F IB = EθcUB(q∗, θ)− Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)
]
.
Then the incumbent achieves the profit of Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)−
UB(q˜B, θ)
]
> 0.
Now suppose that the entrant subsidizes the seller. Then its best response to the incum-
bent’s strategy involves
−FES ' EθcUS(qI , c)− F IS
−FEB + EθcUB(qE, θ) ' −min{F IB, 0} .
And the entrant’s profit Eθc
[
V (qE, θ)−C(qE, c)−US(qE, c)
]
+F IS−EθcUS(qI , c)+min{F IB, 0}
is maximized by qE = q˜S.
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The incumbent’s best response when the entrant subsidizes the seller involves
−F IS + EθcUS(qI , c) ' −FES
−F IB + EθcUB(qI , θ) ' 0 .
The incumbent’s profit of Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)−C(qI , c)]+FES is maximized by qI = q∗. Moreover,
F IB = EθcUB(q∗, θ) and the incumbent sets F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c) − Eθc
[
V (q˜S, θ) − C(q˜S, c) −
US(q˜S, c)
]
to induce zero profit for the entrant.
However, in the simultaneous move game, the incumbent does not know a priori whether
the entrant will offer subsidizing for the buyer or the seller.
Suppose that the incumbent believes that the entrant subsidizes the buyer, and sets
qI = q∗, F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c) and F IB = EθcUB(q∗, θ)−Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)−C(q˜B, c)−UB(q˜B, θ)
]
. If
the entrant responds by subsidizing the buyer, it gets zero profit. If, however, the entrant
responds by subsidizing the seller, its profit is
Eθc
[
[V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)
]
+ min{F IB, 0} .
If this profit is larger than zero, the entrant prefers to respond with subsidizing the seller.
This happens when
Eθc
[
[V (q˜S, θ)−C(q˜S, c)−US(q˜S, c)
]
> EθcUB(q∗, θ)−Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)−C(q˜B, c)−UB(q˜B, θ)
] ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ ∆ < EθcUB(q∗, θ) .
Therefore, if ∆ < EθcUB(q∗, θ) then the entrant has incentive do deviate away from subsi-
dizing the buyer. Conversely, if ∆ ≥ EθcUB(q∗, θ) there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
where the entrant subsidizes the buyer, and the incumbent responds optimally.
Suppose now that the incumbent believes that the entrant subsidizes the seller, and
sets its strategy optimally under this belief. By similar reasoning we can show that if
∆ > −EθcUS(q∗, c), then the entrant has incentive to deviate away from subsidizing the
seller. And if ∆ ≤ −EθcUS(q∗, c), then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where the
entrant subsidizes the seller, and the incumbent responds optimally.
Notice that for ∆ such that −EθcUS(q∗, c) < ∆ < EθcUB(q∗, θ) there does not exist a
pure strategy equilibrium. If the incumbent believes that the entrant subsidizes the buyers,
the entrant’s best response is to subsidize the sellers and vice versa. That is, there does not
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exists a pure strategy for the entrant which fulfills the incumbent’s expectations. Therefore,
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist.
The discussion above directly leads to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the incumbent and the entrant compete in a simultaneous move
game. Then
1. For ∆ ≥ EθcUB(q∗, θ) there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where the
entrant subsidizes the buyer.
2. For ∆ ≤ −EθcUS(q∗, c) there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where the
entrant subsidizes the seller.
3. For −EθcUS(q∗, c) < ∆ < EθcUB(q∗, θ) there does not exist a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium.
B Competition under Sequential-Move Game where
the Entrant Plays First
In Section 3 we considered the case where the incumbent sets the contract slightly before
the entrant. In this section, we consider a version of the competition game, in which the
entrant moves before the incumbent. We show that there are multiple equilibria. In all of
them the incumbent dominates the market and sets qI = q∗, regardless of ∆. Therefore,
unlike the opposite case where the incumbent moves first, here the incumbent never distorts
the quantity. Moreover, we provide a minimal boundary on the incumbent’s profit, and show
that the incumbent can earn at least as much as it earns in the competition game under
simultaneous move game or the sequential move game when the incumbent moves first, for
the case where ∆ is sufficiently high.
To this end, suppose that the entrant offers a contract {FEB , FES , tEB(θ, c), tES (θ, c), qE(θ, c)},
and consider first the incumbent’s best response to the entrant’s contract. As the incumbent
only needs to ensure that there is an equilibrium in which both sides join the incumbent,
the incumbent will charge:
−F IB + EθcUB(qI , θ) ' −min{FEB , 0},
−F IS + EθcUS(qI , c) ' −min{FES , 0}.
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Hence the incumbent earns:
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)]+ min{FES , 0}+ min{FEB , 0}.
Maximizing the incumbent’s profit with respect to qI yields that the incumbent sets qI
= q∗. Consequently, regardless of the entrant’s first-stage strategies, the incumbent sets the
welfare-maximizing quantity.
Next we turn to showing that there is no equilibrium in which the entrant dominates the
market. To dominate the market, the entrant has to ensure that the incumbent earns non-
positive payoff from the above strategies. Moreover, as the entrant suffers from unfavorable
beliefs, the entrant has to set negative access fees for at least one side. Suppose first that in
entrant sets FEB < 0. To ensure that the incumbent earns negative profit, the entrant sets:
FEB = −Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]−min{FES , 0}.
Hence, the entrant earns:
ΠE(attracting B|qE) = Eθc
[
V (qE, θ)− C(qE, c)− UB(qE, θ)− US(qE, c)
]
+ FES −min{FES , 0} − Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)].
Notice that for FES < 0, the entrant’s profit is independent of F
E
S , while for F
E
S > 0
the entrant’s profit is increasing in FES . Therefore, the entrant sets the highest F
E
S possible:
FES = EθcUS(qE, c), implying that the entrant sets FEB = −Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)−C(q∗, c)] and earns:
ΠE(attracting B|qE) = Eθc
[
V (qE, θ)− C(qE, c)− UB(qE, θ)
]− Eθc[V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)].
The entrant’s profit is maximized at qE = q˜B, and the entrant earns:
ΠE(attracting B|q˜B) = Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)
]− Eθc[V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)] < 0.
Following the same argument, if the entrant sets FES < 0, the entrant’s maximal profit
is:
ΠE(attracting S|q˜S) = Eθc
[
V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)
]− Eθc[V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)] < 0.
Therefore, the entrant cannot earn positive profit, implying that there are multiple equi-
libria in which the incumbent dominates the market. Next we provide a minimum boundary
on the incumbent’s equilibrium profit. We focus on the more realistic case where the entrant
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does not set prices that inflict negative profit for the entrant, should both sides choose to
join the entrant given these prices. Without this restriction, the entrant could dissipate the
entire incumbent’s profit. To this end, notice that if the entrant sets FEB < 0, then the above
discussion indicates that the entrant sets FES = EθcUS(q˜B, c) and earns:
ΠE(attractingB|q˜B) = Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)
]
+ FEB .
Therefore the lowest FEB that the entrant can set is F
E
B = − Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ) − C(q˜B, c) −
UB(q˜B, θ)
]
and the incumbent earns:
ΠI = Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc[V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)].
Likewise, if the entrant sets FES < 0, the incumbent earns:
ΠI = Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc[V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)].
Therefore, the incumbent’s minimum equilibrium profit is:
ΠI = Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]
−max{Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)
]
,Eθc
[
V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)
]}.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the entrant moves slightly before the incumbent. Then, there
are multiple equilibria. In all equilibria, the incumbent dominates the market and sets the
welfare-maximizing quantity, q∗. Moreover, the incumbent earns at least as much as in the
simultaneous move game or the opposite sequential move game for the case where ∆ is high.
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C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (page 18)
Proof. With optimal tIB and t
I
S given by (3), the incumbent sets F
I
B, F
I
S , and q
I(θ, c) in
ContI to maximize
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)− UB(qI , c)− US(qI , c)
]
+ F IB + F
I
S
s.t.
Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]− EθcUB(qI , θ) + F IB + min{F IS , 0} ≤ 0 , (15)
Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]− EθcUS(qI , c) + F IS + min{F IB, 0} ≤ 0 , (16)
EθcUB(qI , θ)− F IB ≥ 0 , (17)
EθcUS(qI , c)− F IS ≥ 0 . (18)
The first two constraints assure that the entrant cannot profitable from winning the
market, in that ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) ≤ 0 and ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) ≤ 0 respec-
tively. The third and forth constraints assure that the two sides indeed agree to join the
incumbent over the option of staying out of the market.
The plan of the proof is the following. We first establish that at least (15) or (16) has
to bind. Then, we show that there is no equilibrium with both F IB > 0 and F
I
S > 0. Then,
we characterize the incumbent’s optimal pricing given that the incumbent sets F IB ≤ 0. The
solution for the case where F IS ≤ 0 is symmetric with the seller replacing the buyer.
Starting with the first part of the proof, suppose that (15) and (16) are slack. Then,
it is optimal for the incumbent to set F IB = EθcUB(qI , θ) > 0 and F IS = EθcUS(qI , c) > 0.
But then constraints (15) and (16) lead to Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] < 0 and
Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] < 0, which is a contradiction. We therefore have that at
least (15) or (16) has to bind.
Next, we show that there is no equilibrium with both F IB > 0 and F
I
S > 0. Suppose
that both F IB > 0 and F
I
S > 0 and suppose, without loss of generality, that EθcUB(q∗, θ) <
EθcUS(q∗, c). Substituting F IB > 0 and F IS > 0 into (15) and (16) yields:
F IB ≤ −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(qI , θ) , (19)
F IS ≤ −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + EθcUS(qI , c) . (20)
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Since the RHS of (19) and (20) is lower than EθcUB(qI , θ) and EθcUS(qI , c) respectively,
the incumbent will set F IB and F
I
S such that (19) and (20) hold with equality. The incumbent
earns
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)− UB(qI , c)− US(qI , c)
]
+ F IB + F
I
S
= Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]−
− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] .
Therefore, the incumbent sets qI = q∗, but then:
F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ)
< −Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)− UB(q∗, θ)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ)
< −Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)− UB(q∗, θ)− US(q∗, c)]
< 0,
where the first inequality follows from revealed preference, the second inequality follows
because by assumption EθcUB(q∗, θ) < EθcUS(q∗, c) and the third inequality follows from
condition (12). Therefore, it cannot be that the optimal solution involves both F IB > 0 and
F IS > 0. Notice that if EθcUB(q∗, θ) > EθcUS(q∗, c) we can equivalently show that F IS < 0.
Next, we move to solve the case where the incumbent finds it optimal to set F IB ≤ 0.
Since either (15), (16) or both bind, it must be that one of the three cases occurs:
Case 1: 0=ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) > ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI);
Case 2: 0=ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) > ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI);
Case 3: 0=ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) = ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) .
The proof proceeds by considering those three cases in turn.
Case 1: 0 = ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) > ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI)
Suppose that ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) = 0. Then, the incumbent sets:
F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(qI , θ)−min{F IS , 0} .
Substituting F IB into the incumbent’s profit function yields:
ΠI(qI) =Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)− UB(qI , θ)− US(qI , c)
]
+
− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(qI , θ)−min{F IS , 0}+ F IS .
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The profit ΠI(qI) is independent of F IS for F
I
S ≤ 0 and ΠI(qI) is increasing with F IS for
F IS > 0. Therefore, the incumbent sets the highest possible F
I
S = EθcUS(qI , c). Substituting
F IS = EθcUS(qI , c) back into ΠI(qI) and rearranging yields:
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
To maximize the profit, the incumbent will set qI = q∗. The maximized profit then is
ΠI(q∗) = Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] . (21)
Given the optimal values, and the condition that characterizes Case 1, we conclude that
this solution is available to the incumbent when
Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]− EθcUS(qI , c) + F IS + min{F IB, 0} <
< Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]− EθcUB(qI , θ) + F IB + min{F IS , 0}
After substituting for F IB, F
I
S and q
I and rearranging the terms, this inequality is equivalent
to
∆ > EθcUB(q∗, θ).
Case 2: ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) < ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) = 0
Suppose that ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI)=0. Then, recalling that by assumption F IB < 0,
the incumbent sets:
F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + EθcUS(qI , c)− F IS .
Substituting this F IB into the incumbent’s profit function yields:
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)− UB(qI , θ)
]− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] .
Notice that ΠI(qI) is independent of F IS for all F
I
S . To maximize its profit, the incumbent
sets qI = q˜B. The maximized profit then is
ΠI(q˜B) = Eθc
[
V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)
]− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] = ∆ . (22)
Substituting F IB and q
I into the inequality ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) < ΠE(attracting
S|q˜S, ContI), yields
∆− EθcUB(q˜B, θ) < F IS − EθcUS(q˜B, c)−min{F IS , 0} .
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Notice that the LHS of this inequality is independent of F IS for F
I
S < 0, and increasing with
F IS for F
I
S > 0. Therefore, to ensure the inequality the incumbent needs to set F
I
S as high
as possible, implying that F IS =EθcUS(q˜B, c). Therefore, this solution is possible for any
0 ≤ ∆ < EθcUB(q˜B, θ).
Case 3: 0 = ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) = ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI)
Notice that if the strategy that maximizes the incumbent’s profit exists when only one
of the constraints (15) or (16) bind, it must yield a higher profit than the most profitable
strategy with both constraints assumed to be binding. Therefore, Case 3 is relevant only
for parameters for which neither Case 1 or Case 2 solutions are available. Thus, we consider
this case only for such ∆ where EθcUB(q˜B, θ) ≤ ∆ ≤ EθcUB(q∗, θ).
To solve case 3, we follow the solution to case 1 in which
F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(qI , θ)
and F IS = EθcUS(qI , c), and add the Lagrangian multiplier to the additional constraint that
ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) ≤ 0 (an equivalent way is to follow Case 2 and add the La-
grangian multiplier to the constraint that ΠE(attracting B|q˜B, ContI) ≤ 0). Substitut-
ing F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(qI , θ) and F IS = EθcUS(qI , c) into
ΠE(attracting S|q˜S, ContI) ≤ 0 requires that ∆ − EθcUB(qI , θ) ≥ 0. Given this constraint,
the incumbent profit can be expressed as
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)−C(qI , c)]−Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]+λ[∆−EθcUB(qI , θ)] ,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Differentiating with respect to qI and λ yields following
conditions for the optimal ˜˜q∆ and λ:
Vq(˜˜q∆, θ)− Cq(˜˜q∆, c)− λ1− F (θ)
f(θ)
Vθc(˜˜q∆, θ) = 0 , (23)
∆− EθcUB(˜˜q∆, θ) = 0 .
We turn to establishing that the optimal solution involves 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and q∗ ≥ ˜˜q∆ ≥ q˜B.
To see why, suppose first that ∆ = EθcUB(q∗, θ). Then, it is easy to see that the solution
to the two equations above is at ˜˜q∆ = q
∗ and λ = 0. As ∆ decreases below EθcUB(q∗, θ),
the constraint ∆ = EθcUB(˜˜q∆, θ) requires that ˜˜q∆ decreases below q∗. This is because by
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assumption Vqθ > 0, and therefore Eθc [UB(q, θ)] is increasing in q. At the same time, for
∆ < EθcUB(q∗, θ) the condition (23) requires that λ increases above 0. This is because the
LHS of (23) is decreasing with λ, and therefore the q that solves (23) is decreasing with λ.
For ∆ = EθcUB(q˜B, θ), the constraint ∆ = EθcUB(˜˜q∆, θ) requires that ˜˜q∆ = q˜B, while
the condition (23) requires that λ = 1. This is because by definition q = q˜B is the solution
to Vq(q, θ) − Cq(q, c) − 1 · 1−F (θ)f(θ) Vθc(q, θ) = 0. Therefore, it must be that 1 ≤ λ ≤ 0,
q∗ ≥ ˜˜q∆ ≥ q˜B, and ˜˜q∆ is decreasing with ∆, while λ is decreasing with ∆. Moreover, in the
optimal solution (15), (16) and (18) bind only if EθcUB(q˜B, θ) ≤ ∆ ≤ EθcUB(q∗, θ). When
this is the case, the incumbent earns
ΠI(˜˜q∆) = Eθc
[
V (˜˜q∆, θ)− C(˜˜q∆, c)
]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
To sum up the three possible cases, we conclude that:
• For ∆ > EθcUB(q∗, c) the optimal solution for the incumbent falls into Case 1. The
incumbent sets qI = q∗, F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ) <
0, and F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c) > 0, and induces the entrant to set qE = q˜B and to attract
the buyer’s side. The entrant earns zero profits, while the incumbent earns
ΠI(q∗) = Eθc
[
V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
• For 0 ≤ ∆ < EθcUB(q˜B, c) the optimal solution for the incumbent falls into Case 2.
The incumbent sets qI = q˜B, F
I
B = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] < 0, and
F IS = EθcUS(q˜B, c) > 0, and induces the entrant to set qE = q˜S and to attract the
seller’s side. The entrant earns zero profits, while the incumbent earns ΠI(q˜B) = ∆.
• For EθcUB(q˜B, θ) ≤ ∆ ≤ EθcUB(q∗, θ) the only available solution is Case 3. The
incumbent sets qI = ˜˜q∆, F
I
B = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]+EθcUB(˜˜q∆, θ) <
0 and F IS = EθcUS(q˜B, c) > 0 and the entrant is indifferent between setting qE = q˜B
and attracting the buyer, or setting qE = q˜S and attracting the seller. The entrant
earns zero and the incumbent earns
ΠI(˜˜q∆) = Eθc
[
V (˜˜q∆, θ)− C(˜˜q∆, c)
]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] .
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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Proof of Corollary 1 (page 21)
Proof. Since EθUB(q, θ) = 0, then formula (7) becomes
Eθc [V (qB, θ)− C(qB, c)− UB(qB, c)] = Eθc [V (qB, θ)− C(qB, c)] ,
and it is maximized by q˜B = q
∗.
For ∆ > 0, ∆ > EθUB(q, θ), and case (i) of Proposition 1 applies. But since q˜B = q∗
and Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, c)] = Eθc [V (q∗B, θ)− C(q∗B, c)], then qI = qE = q∗ and
both platforms’ profits are 0.
For ∆ = 0, ∆ = EθUB(q, θ), and the special case of (iii) in Proposition 1 applies. It yields
the same result.
Proof of Proposition 2 (page 24)
Proof. The incumbent’s objective is to maximize
ΠI(qI) = Eθc
[
V (qI , θ)− C(qI , c)− UB(qI , θ)− US(qI , c)
]
+ F IB + F
I
S
s.t.
Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]− EθcUB(qI , θ) + F IB ≤ 0, (24)
Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]− EθcUB(qI , θ) + F IB ≤ 0, (25)
EθcUB(qI , θ)− F IB ≥ 0, (26)
EθcUS(qI , c)− F IS ≥ 0. (27)
As follows from the entrant’s decision which side to attract, regardless of the incumbent’s
strategy, if ∆ > 0, then constraint (24) is binding while (25) is slack. Likewise, if ∆ < 0,
then constraint (25) is binding while (24) is slack. Moreover, in both cases the incumbent
uses F IB for imposing zero profit on the entrant and therefore would like to set F
I
S as high as
possible implying that (27) also binds while (26) is slack.
(i) Substituting (27) and (24) with equality for the case of ∆ > 0 into the incumbent’s
profit and solving leads us directly to the result in Proposition 2.
(ii) For the case of ∆ < 0, (27) and (25) are substituted with equality into the incumbent’s
profit.
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This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 2 (page 25)
Proof. We first show that the incumbent earns higher profit under multi-homing than
under single-homing. Suppose first that 0 < ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]. Under single-homing, the
incumbent earns
∆ = Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]
< Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]
≤ Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] + Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)]
= Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] ,
where the first inequality follows because by assumption ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] and the second
inequality follows because by definition q∗ maximizes Eθc [V (q, θ)− C(q, c)] and the last term
is the incumbent’s profit from multi-homing. Next suppose that −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ < 0.
Under single-homing, the incumbent earns
−∆ = Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]
< Eθc [US(q˜S, c)]
≤ Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] + Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)]
= Eθc [V (q∗, θ)− C(q∗, c)]− Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] ,
where again the first inequality follows because by assumption −∆ < Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] and the
second inequality follows because by definition q∗ maximizes Eθc [V (q, θ)− C(q, c)] and the
last term is the incumbent’s profit from multi-homing.
Next, we show that given that the incumbent sets the multi-homing strategies, the entrant
will impose exclusive dealing and dominate the market with a positive profit. Suppose
first that 0 < ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]. Under multi-homing, the incumbent sets: qI = q∗,
F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ) and F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c). If the
entrant does not impose exclusivity then the entrant earns zero profit. Suppose however
that the entrant imposed exclusivity on the seller. Then, the entrant can attract the seller
by charging:
−FES & −F IS + EθcUS(q∗, c) = 0 =⇒ FES = 0.
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Given that the seller now moves exclusively to the entrant, the entrant can charge the buyer:
EθcUB(qE, θ)− FEB & −min{−F IB, 0} =⇒ FEB = EθcUB(qE, θ) + min{F IB, 0}.
The entrant earns:
ΠE(attracting S|qE) = Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + min{F IB, 0}.
If F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)]+EθcUB(q∗, θ) > 0, then the entrant earns
Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] > 0. If F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] +
EθcUB(q∗, θ) < 0, then the entrant earns:
ΠE(attracting S|qE) = Eθc [V (q˜S , θ)− C(q˜S , c)− US(q˜S , c)] + min{F IB, 0}
= Eθc [V (q˜S , θ)− C(q˜S , c)− US(q˜S , c)]− Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ)
= Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)]−∆
> Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]−∆
> 0,
where the first inequality follows because Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)] > Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] and the second
inequality follows because by assumption ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)].
Next suppose that −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ < 0. Under multihoming the incumbent sets:
qI = q∗, F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)]+EθcUB(q∗, θ) and F IS = EθcUS(q∗, c). If
the entrant does not impose exclusivity then the entrant earns zero profit. Suppose however
that the entrant imposed exclusivity on the seller. Then, the entrant can attract the seller
by charging:
−FES ' −F IS + EθcUS(q∗, c) = 0 =⇒ FES = 0.
Given that the seller now moves exclusively to the entrant, the entrant can charge the buyer:
EθcUB(qE, θ)− FEB ' −min{−F IB, 0} =⇒ FEB = EθcUB(qE, θ) + min{F IB, 0}.
The entrant earns:
ΠE(attracting S|qE) = Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + min{F IB, 0}.
If F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ) > 0, then the entrant earns
Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− US(q˜S, c)] > 0. If F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] +
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EθcUB(q∗, θ) < 0, then the entrant earns
ΠE(attracting S|qE) = Eθc [V (q˜S , θ)− C(q˜S , c)− US(q˜S , c)] + min{F IB, 0}
= Eθc [V (q˜S , θ)− C(q˜S , c)− US(q˜S , c)]− Eθc [V (q˜S , θ)− C(q˜S , c)− US(q˜S , c)] + EθcUB(q∗, θ)
= Eθc[UB(q∗, θ)]
> 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3 (page 26)
Proof.
(i) Suppose that 0 < ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)] . Given that the incumbent expects the entrant
to impose exclusive dealing, the incumbent’s optimal strategies is to set the single-
homing strategies: F IB = −Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)], and F IS = EθcUS(q˜B, c).
To show that given these strategies the entrant imposes exclusive dealing, substituting
them into the entrant’s multi-homing profit yields:
ΠE(attracting B|q˜B) = Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)] + F IB − EθcUB(q˜B, θ)
= ∆− EθcUB(q˜B, θ)
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that ∆ < Eθc [UB(q˜B, θ)]. If the
entrant imposes exclusive dealing, Proposition 2 implies that the entrant earns zero
profit. Between these two options, the entrant will therefore choose to impose exclusive
dealing.
(ii) Next, suppose that −Eθc [US(q˜S, c)] < ∆ < 0.Given that the incumbent expects the en-
trant to impose exclusive dealing, the incumbent’s optimal strategies is to set the single-
homing strategies: F IB = EθcUB(q˜S, θ) and F IS = −Eθc [V (q˜B, θ)− C(q˜B, c)− UB(q˜B, θ)].
To show that given these strategies the entrant does not impose exclusive dealing, sub-
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stituting them into the entrant’s multi-homing profit yields:
ΠE(attracting S|q˜S) = Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + F IB − EθcUB(q˜S, θ)
= Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] + EθcUB(q˜S, θ)− EθcUB(q˜S, θ)
= Eθc [V (q˜S, θ)− C(q˜S, c)− US(q˜S, c)] > 0.
Consequently, the entrant will not find it optimal to impose exclusive dealing. This
implies that in addition to setting the single-homing strategies, the incumbent will
have to impose exclusivity.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 3 (page 30)
Proof. Suppose that the incumbent adopted incremental technology, E , while the entrant
adopted the radical technology. Moreover, the radical technology turned out to be success-
ful, H. Consider now the simultaneous pricing game.
By the same method as in the Section 3, we find that the best profit the incumbent may
achieve while deterring the entrant from the market is
Eθc
[
V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)]− Eθc [V H(q˜B(H), θ)− CH(q˜B(H), c)− UH(q˜B(H), θ)] .
Our analysis is interesting only if this profit is negative,20 hence condition (14).
Since under (14) it is too costly for the incumbent to prevent the entrant from serving
the market, we now solve the profit maximization problem of the entrant preventing the
incumbent from serving the market.
For a given strategy of the entrant under successful radical technology, ContE(H), the
incumbent’s best response is
F IS(E) /EθcUES (qI(E), c) + min{FES (H), 0}
F IB(E) .EθcUEB(qI(E), θ) + min{FEB (H), 0} .
20If the incumbent’s profit in this case is positive, the entrant’s dominant strategy is to adopt the incre-
mental technology, and the only equilibrium is where both platforms adopt E .
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Those are new participation constraints. And these are the only constraints for the incum-
bent in this situation. Substituting for F IS(E) and F IB(E) in the incumbent’s profit yields
ΠI(qI |E ,H) = Eθc[V E(qI(E), θ)− CE(qI(E), c)− UEB(qI(E), θ)− UES (qI(E), c)] + EθcUES (qI(E), c)+
+ min{FES (H), 0}+ EθcUEB(qI(E), θ) + min{FEB (H), 0} =
= Eθc[V E(qI(E), θ)− CE(qI(E), c)] + min{FES (H), 0}+ min{FEB (H), 0} .
This profit is maximized for qI = q∗(E).
The entrant attracts the buyer’s side:
−FEB (H) ≥ EθcUEB(q∗(E), θ)−F IB(E) = −min{FEB (H), 0} ⇐⇒ FEB (H) ≤ min{FEB (H), 0} .
Suppose that FEB (H) > 0, then FEB (H) ≤ 0 — a contradiction. Hence, it must be that
FEB (H) ≤ 0.
After the entrant attracted the buyer’s side, the seller’s side joins the entrant when
−FES (H) + EθcUSH(qE(H), c) ≥ −min{F IS(E), 0} ,
where F IS(E) = EθcUES (q∗(E), c) + min{FES (H), 0}. Increasing FES (H) increases the entrant’s
profit without affecting other constraints. Therefore, it is optimal for the incumbent to
increase FES (H) as high as possible, i.e., −FES (H) + EθcUSH(qE(H), c) = 0.
Therefore, the entrant’s objective is to maximize
ΠE(qE|E ,H) = Eθc[V H(qE, θ)− CH(qE, c)− UBH(qE, θ)− USH(qE, c)] + FEB (H) + FES (H)
s.t.,
Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)] + min{FES (H), 0}+ min{FEB (H), 0} ≤0 ,
FEB (H) ≤0 ,
−FES (H) + EθcUSH(qE, c) =0 .
It is straightforward to show that the first constraint also binds. Therefore, we obtain
FES (H) = EθcUSH(qE(H), c), and
Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)−CE(q∗(E), c)]+FEB (H) = 0 =⇒ FEB (H) = −Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)−CE(q∗(E), c)] .
After substituting those into the profit function,
ΠE(qE|E ,H) = Eθc[V H(qE, θ)−CH(qE, c)−UBH(qE, θ)−Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)−CE(q∗(E), c)] .
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This profit is maximized for qE = q˜B(H), and yields
ΠE(q˜B(H)|E ,H) = Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)−CH(q˜B(H), c)−UBH(q˜B(H), θ)−Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)−CE(q∗(E), c)] > 0 .
The profit is positive due to (14).
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 4 (page 31)
Proof. Consider first a condition for an equilibrium (not necessarily a unique one) in
which the entrant chooses the radical technology and the incumbent chooses the incremental
technology. Given that the incumbent chooses the incremental technology, Table 1 reveals
that the entrant will always choose the radical technology. Moreover, given that the entrant
chooses the radical technology, the incumbent chooses the incremental technology if (1−
ρ)ΠI(E ,L) > ρΠI(H,H), or ρ < ρ, where:
ρ ≡ Eθc[V
E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)]
Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)− CH(q∗(H), c)]− (Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)− CH(q˜B(H), c)− UHB (q˜B(H), θ)]− Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)])
.
Since Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)−CH(q∗(H), c)] > Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)−CH(q˜B(H), c)−UHB (q˜B(H), θ)] >
Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)], 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Moreover, notice that if (1− k(θ))/K(θ) −→ 0
andG(c)/g(c) −→ 0, then Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)−CH(q˜B(H), c)−UHB (q˜B(H), θ)] −→ Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)−
CH(q∗(H), c)], implying that ρ −→ 1.
Next, consider a condition for an equilibrium (not necessarily a unique one) in which
the entrant chooses the incremental technology and the incumbent chooses the radical tech-
nology. Given that the incumbent chooses the radical technology, Table 1 reveals that
the entrant will always choose the incremental technology. Moreover, given that the en-
trant chooses the incremental technology, the incumbent chooses the radical technology if:
ΠI(E , E) < ρ ΠI(H, E), or:ρ >ρ, where:
ρ ≡ Eθc[V
E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)]− Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ)− CE(q˜B(E), c)− UEB(q˜B(E), θ)]
Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)− CH(q∗(H), c)]− Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ)− CE(q˜B(E), c)− UEB(q˜B(E), θ)]
.
Since both the numerator and the denominator are positives and since Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)−
CH(q∗(H), c)] > Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ) − CE(q∗(E), c)], 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Moreover, notice that if (1 −
k(θ))/K(θ) −→ 0 andG(c)/g(c) −→ 0, then Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ)−CE(q˜B(E), c)−UEB(q˜B(E), θ)] −→
Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)], implying that ρ −→ 0.
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Next we turn to compare between ρ and ρ. To facilitate notations, let:
X ≡ Eθc[V E(q˜B(E), θ)− CE(q˜B(E), c)− UEB(q˜B(E), θ)],
Y ≡ Eθc[V E(q∗(E), θ)− CE(q∗(E), c)],
Z ≡ Eθc[V H(q∗(H), θ)− CH(q∗(H), c)].
Notice that Z > Y > X. Therefore:
ρ ≡ Y
Z − (Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)− CH(q˜B(H), c)− UHB (q˜B(H), θ)]− Y )
>
Y
Z
=
Y (Z −X)
Z(Z −X) =
Y Z − Y X
Z2 − ZX
>
Y Z − ZX
Z2 − ZX =
Y −X
Z −X = ρ,
where the first inequality follows because Eθc[V H(q˜B(H), θ)−CH(q˜B(H), c)−UHB (q˜B(H), θ)] >
Y and the second inequality follows because Z > Y > X. Since ρ > ρ, we have that for
ρ ∈ [0, ρ], there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses the incremental
technology while the entrant chooses the radical technology, for ρ ∈ [ρ, 1] there is a unique
Nash equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses the radical technology while the entrant
chooses the incremental technology, while for ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ] there are two Nash equilibria in which
the two platforms choose different technologies.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
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